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FOREIGN MAREIAGE - VALIDITY - ALIENS - EXCLUSION. -
United States ex rel. Devine et al. v. Rodgers, Commissioner of
Immigration et al., 109 Federal, 886 (District Court, E. D. Penn.
sylvania June 26, 1901). To question a foreign marriage is such
a grave matter, to declare it void is in general so undesirable,
that he, who reads the headnote to this case, will naturally stop
to look into the particular reasons for the decision.
A continuous flow of immigration makes the question of
the validity of foreign marriages one of especial concern in this
country. The present case illustrates this. "The relator is a
naturalized citizen of the United States and' is the husband of
. Rosa Devine and father of her idiot son, William. Rosa and
William are Russian Jews, whom the Commissioner of TIm grd-
tion has ordered to be deported on the ground that both are aliens,
that William is an idiot and Rosa is a pauper, that is likely to be-
come a public charge." The alienage of both is denied upon the
ground, that Rosa is the lawful wife of the relator according to
the laws of Russia, where the marriage ceremony took place;
wherefrom it would follow that when the husband became a
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citizen of the United States his wife and child ceased to be
aliens. The point to be decided then is whether Rosa, who is her
husband's niece, is also his lawful wife under the laws of the
State of Pennsylvania, which declare a marriage between uncle
and niece void and subject the parties to a fine, not exceeding
$500, and an imprisonment not exceeding three years. The court
was satisfied with the proof submitted to show that a marriage
between uncle and niece was valid in Russia, "and being valid
there, the general rule is that the marriage should be regarded
everywhere as valid. But there is this exception at least: if the
relation entered into elsewhere, though lawful in a foreign
country, is stigmatized as incestuous by the law of Pennsylvania,
no rule of comity requires a court sitting in this state to recog-
nize the foreign marriage as valid. . . So far as concerns
the material conditions of the contract of marriage, we must
distinguish between such hindrances as would have impeded mar-
riage but cannot dissolve it when already concluded, and such
as would actually dissolve a marriage if celebrated in the face of
them. . . . A. matrimonial relation that in the last sense is
prohibited by our laws cannot be tolerated. . . . A continu-
ance of that relation would expose the parties to indictment in
the criminal courts. Whatever may be the standard of conduct
in another country, the moral sense of this community would be
shocked by the spectacle of an uncle and his niece living together
as husband and wife. I am of course bound to regard the stand-
ard that prevails here, and to see that such an objectionable
example is not presented to the public."
The court clearly holds that the facts of this case justify a
plain exception to the general rule: "that a marriage good
where celebrated is good everywhere." The validity of the
exception may perhaps be best tested in the light of the reasons
for the general rule. One of these reasons is mentioned in the
decision: the comity of nations, which prompts one state to
recognize a marriage lawfully solemnized in another. But it
would seem to us that the fundamental reason for the rule is
still more firmly built. There is here a cause stronger than the
one which calls for the exercise of international comity in a suit
on a foreign contract. It is based upon a man's natural right to
marry whenever and wherever he pleases. When he exercises
that right by marrying in a foreign state, there can be but one
proof of the mutual consent--the essence-of the marriage, and
that is by record at the time, and according to the law of the
place of ceremony. That this marriage should then be consid-
ered valid everywhere is ital to the integrity of society, and the
rights and honor of the parties concerned. It is not then merely
the observance of an especial courtesy due to the laws of one
nation by another, but a broad ground of public policy, which
prompts the recognition of a foreign marriage.
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The Wisdom of this general rule is so well recognized, that to
consider an exception is to inquire into a case where it was prac-
tically impossible to avoid a conflict of laws.
"International law protects marriage as practiced in- Christian
countries but not polygamy," and, therefore, polygamous rela-
tions which are often mentioned as the first and evident exception
are really not in conflict with the rule, since they do not fall
within its application.
Nor does the law of nations protect marriages contrary to the
law of nature, for in doing so it would protect that which all
Christendom condemns. The marriage considered in the present
case is not contrary to such general laws of nature, universally
recognized, for we have seen that it is sanctioned in Russia.
"Whatever may be the scruples as to connections between rela-
tives further removed than brother and sister in the collateral
line of consanguinity, the better opinion does not hold them
incestuous by natural law." Indeed this is the only consistent
view to take, for otherwise we would be making natural law
something dependent on the jurisdiction (or sectional, as are the
laws prohibiting the mingling of black blood and white). Even
in the same state the so-called natural law would change with
the enactment of different statutes. An example is to be found
in Kentucky, where marriage with an uncle's widow is enumer-
ated among the unlawful marriages in the act of 1798, but is
omitted in the Revised Statutes of 1852 (R. S. of Ky., p. 384).
Additional proof of the fact that there is no universal law of
nature prohibiting marriage between the remoter degrees of
collateral kindred is to be found curiously enough in the present
case, which cites Medway v. Needham (16 Mass. 157, 1819) to
show the invalidity of a marriage between uncle and niece, while
a later Massachusetts case, Sutton v. Warren (10 Met. 451,
1845), cites the very same case in confirming a foreign marriage
between nephew and aunt. The dictum referred to in both deci-
sions merely states without further definition that marriages
against the law of nature will not be tolerated.
Let us therefore consider the statutes conflicting with the
general rule recognizing foreign marriages, aside from questions
of universal natural law, since "each state is the conservator of its
own morals," and adapts its marriage laws to its own peculiar
social conditions; adding by way of qualification Mr. Bishop's
statement (in his book on "Marriage and Divorce," § 373) that
i strong implication in the statutes, combined with a strong and
well-known public opinion, should be accepted by the tribunals
as a legislative direction to them, Dupre v. Boulard (10 La. An.
411, 1855).
It will be remembered that the present case is decided on a
statute prohibiting marriage between uncle and niece: Act of
1860, § 39 (P. L. 393). Laws with the same provision mov
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found in the great majority of the states (Arkansas, Mansf. Dig.
4908; Kansas Comp. Laws, chap. lxi, § 2; New York Gen. Laws,
chap. xlviii, § 2; Tennessee Mill and V. Code, 3291; Vermont
R. S. 2628).
Wherever a statute regulating marriage is peculiar to a par-
ticular state, it conflicts with the general rule upholding the
validity of foreign marriages. One or the other must yield.
The question then resolves itself into one of the construction of
the force and intent of the statute.
There are many statutory provisions that yield without ques-
tion. They appertain to the ceremony of marriage, the license,
the authority of the person officiating, etc. On this point the
law of England and of the States is in accord. Sottomayer v.
De Barros (3 P. D. 5, 1877). It will be recalled for examplethat
the "Gretna Green marriages" were formerly good, although
without consent of the parents."
The case under consideration distinguishes matters of cere-
mony from faults that go to the capacity of the parties because
the latter survive-the ceremony, and continue to exist as long as
the marriage exists. Such faults it will not tolerate in a foreign
marriage. Therein it follows the English cases Brook v. Brook
(9 H. L. Cases, 193, 1861) and Warrenden v. Warrenden (2 C1.
and F. 531, 1835i whereinsee a dictum on the identical point
of this case).
The reasons for the position of the court in vpholding the laws of
the State, where a foreign marriage is concerned, are very strong.
If the statute were not enforced in the case of foreigners, they
would be permitted to live openly, and perhaps happily, in plain
contradiction to the law, which forbids the relation that they
hold to all the citizens within its jurisdiction. Whatever reasons
of public policy and public health the state may have for making
this law are equally defeated. The indirect results are quite
as serious, for experience has shown that the toleration of a for-
eign marriage, prohibited under the local law, is immediately
followed by a flocking into other states for the solemnization of
the forbidden marriage and a consequent return home under
protection of said toleration. That fritters away the strength
and dignity of the law, for what is a statute worth if it may be
avoided by stepping into a neighboring state?
But in upholding the sovereignty of the state we sacrifice
much-in this case we sacrifice all that the law generally encour-
ages, and the relator holds most dear, with not the slightest wrong
on his part, wittingly or unwittingly. For here the invalidity
of the marriage means -the deportation of wife and child-a
separation from husband and father; a breaking of all the family
ties and rights. Nor is this case even a full example, for here
the unfortunate wife is an immigrant, who is deported when she
threatens to become a public burden. Let us eliminate this spe-
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cial element from the case, and we have her left among us with-
out a vestige of all those marital rights which she acquired under
a marriage good and valid when it was made in Russia; while
her son, legitimate when born, suddenly becomes illegitimate
(unless a statute provides otherwise, which in the case of inces-
tuous marriages it generally does not). In accord with the pres-
ent case are In re Stull's Estate (183 Pa. 625, 1897) ; State v.
Brown (47 Ohio, 102, 1890); Marshall v. Marshall (N. Y. 4
Thomp. & 0. 449, 1874) ; State v. Kennedy (N. C. 22 Am. Rep.
683, 1877).
We are forced to conclude, that a great exigency alone can
justify the invalidation of foreign marriages and its result. It
may lie in the reason for the statute, or in the necessity for pre-
serving through it the dignity of the law. Whatever the moving
cause may be, there is authority for saying that it is not sufficient,
"and if it may be deemed a contempt upon the sovereign
authority of the state for its own citizens to withdraw momen-
tarily from her own territory for the purpose of assuming and
bringing back a relation prohibited by the laws, it would still be
worthy of consideration by the legislator, whether the principles
upon which the state assumes to regulate marriage would not be
better subserved by permitting even in such a case, unless the
admitted law of nature be violated, the operation of the general
rule which refers the validity to the lex loci contractus, than by
avoiding it in order to vindicate the sovereign authority of the
state." Stevenson v. Gray (17 B. Monr. 197, 1856, this being the
case of a marriage between a nephew and his uncle's widow per-
formed in Tennessee and held valid in Kentucky, where it vio-
lated the statute).
The case of Sutton v. Warren (10 Met. 451, 1845) seems
strongly in point. In that case a marriage between a nephew
and aunt (of the same degree of consanguinity as an uncle and
niece) was held good in Massachusetts although void by the
statute of that state; and this in spite of the fact, that it was
voidable in England, where it was performed, and that its mini-
mum criminal punishment in Massachusetts is equivalent to the
maximum in Pennsylvania. The marriage there confirmed, is
clearly not as deserving of recognition as is the marriage under
consideration, which was good in Russia,-ahd was nevertheless
held invalid. The Massachusetts case evideiitly holds that the
good policy of affirming marriages, or rather of not disaffirming
them, overrules the evil influence of the shocking "spectacle of
uncle and niece living together as man and wife. ' Nor did the
results seemingly cause a regret of the decision, for the case was
affirmed in Cor. v. Lane (113 Mass. 458, 1873. See the review
herein of Brook v. Brook), also Sponsford v. Johnson (2 Blatch.
U. S. 51, 1847).
Massachusetts and other states have passed .laws declaring void
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marriages in which the parties leave the state merely to avoid
its statutes (Mass. Rev. St., chap. lxxv, § 6), thus preventing
that evasion of the law which otherwise forms the strongest objec-
tion to the view of toleration taken in those states.
We have seen then that the present case represents the seeming
result of the cases in England and some of our states, and that
the Massachusetts view is flatly contrary; that the former inter-
prets the statute forbidding marriages within certain degrees of
relationship as an exception to the general rule that marriages if
valid where made are valid everywhere, while the latter construes
the same statute to yield to the desirability of confirming said
marriages under the said general rule.
We have found further that each position has its own reason
and strength, which is at the same time the weakness of the other.
Whichever position may be the most expedient and just, this
much is certain, that it is deplorable there should be not only so
great a diversity in the marriage laws of the United States, but
also so great a difference in their interpretation. In the present
state of the law it would be possible for the parties here con-
cerned to land in Boston, where, under the cases cited, their mar-
riage would be valid; if they traveled to Ohio their marriage
would be void; if they continued their journey to Kentucky they
would be recognized as husband and wife, and if after twenty
years of married life they came to PennsylvAnia their marriage
with all its accompanying rights would be Void.
In one state a man is married, has children and property
rights; in the neighboring state he is under the same circum-
stances committing incest, subject to criminal action and impris-
onment, has lost all marital property rights and his children are
illegitimate. Surely this vital question which goes to the very
fundament of his own happiness and the state's strength should
not be dependent upon the jurisdiction. If the marriage laws
of the United States were uniform, one state would not, as here,
be forced to sacrifice its sovereignty in order to affirm a mar-
riage performed in another state. A marriage should be subject
-and subject alone-to certain plain and broad laws, unmistak-
able to foreigners, and impressing on all citizens the solemnity
of its rights and liabilities.
MnES AND MIMNG--SuBJACENT SUPPORT-STATUTE OF
LImITATIoNs.-Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474 (Pennsylvania,
April 12, 1900.)
It is a matter of some doubt in many jurisdictions when, in
contemplation of law, a cause of action arises for a failure to
afford subjacent support to surface lands.
It has been determined in several jurisdictions that the cause
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of action arises the moment at which the mining supports-the
ribs and pillars-are weakened to that point at which subsidence
will occur. In other jurisdictions, the conclusion has been
reached that the cause of action arises only when there has been
an actual subsidence.
At what point of time a mining company becomes liable in
action of trespass for damages arising from a "cave in" is one of
the questions of law passed upon in the case of Noonan v. Pardee,
200 Pa. 474. There the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
announced the Pennsylvania rule in these words: "When the
coal was removed without leaving, sufficient pillars, or withoidt
supplying sufficient artificial props, was the time when the sub-
jacent owner failed in an absolute duty he owed to his neighbor
above. And from that time dates the cause of action.".
'"Unless, when the coal was mined, the miner left no pillats,
or too few, . . . there was no cause of action.
"In the base of iiining operations, which are a trespass, the
statute runs from the trespass, though the party mahy have been
ignorant of the act done"
There eipissed is the conclusion of law ahd the reason there-
far. It is uriquestioned law that.the right to subjabent support is
a right incident to ownership of surface land. Bit because it is
one of a class of rights jure nitura,, it is nut necessarily true
that a cause of 'ctiun arises for the breach threof without the
occurrence of actial daniage.
As a- gbneral pihiniple df lar, nothing could be truer than that
every breach of an absolute right gives rise to an ation thdrefor,
irrespective of the occurrence or absence of actual damage. But
the breach of the right to subjacent support is necessarily accom-
panied by actual damage. This "absolute and natural" right
cannot be violated by a trespass,-from which says the court
dates the cause of action,--without actual damage in the way of
a subsidence.
The right of 'support means strictly what the w6rds import:
.a right to support. If support is not afforded the right thereto
is violated. However if the cause of action dates from the time
at which the mine supports are rendered so insufficient that a
subsidence might possibly occur, it seems apparent that the
so-called "right of support" is nothing more than a right against
the possibility or probability of a failure to suppor. A right to
support is a right to have the surface land supported. It is not
a right to have the subjacent owner furnish those means of sup-
port, which a dozen of experts deem to be adequate, in all proba-
bility, to support the surface land.
There is always first a digging and secondly the neglecting
afterwards to afford support. Byles, J., in the case of Bonomi v.
Backhouse, 1 E. B. & E. 630, makes this remark: "Take the
case of a man allowing trees to be on his land which, if they are
,allowed to grow for a certain time, will injure the land of his
NOTES.
neighbor; can the neighbor maintain an action as soon as an
acorn is put in, and before the trees have grown so as to be
injurious ?"
In a like manner, how can it be properly said that a cause of
action accrues when digging in subjacent strata renders a failure
of support possible?
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it is submitted, reached
the conclusion in Noonan v. Pardee, through the failure to dis-
tinguish between that class of rights, jure naturae, the breach
of which may or may not be accompanied by actual damage, and
that class whereof a breach and actual damage necessarily concur.
The right of support is violated when there is no support and
the land subsides.
If the Slipreme Court of Pennsylvania is correct in its con-
clusion that the right of action accrues at that point of time when
the "ribs and pillars" are rendered insufficient to support the
land, how, with consistency, can they conclude that the present
owner in possession, notwithstanding a series of mesne convey-
ances, is alone entitled to recover for the actual damage resulting
froim a subsidence? "When the right to sufficient support has
been violated, the cause of action, it is true, arises, but the owner
iki p6ssessfon when the consequences follow, is the one who
suffers.' "If the .caue of the injury was within six years,
although at the -date of the deed [to the present owners] the
damage was not susceptible of computation, yet afterwards
became so by the subsidence of the surface, their [the present
owners'] right to sue was then fixed, a right which, from the
nature of the case, could not have had more than a doubtful exist-
ence before the actual damage occurred."
"It is certainly true that the purchaser of an estate cannot
claim damages for an injury done to it before his purchase. Such
a claim is a chose in action which remains in the hands of the
vendor. The vendee is presumed to pay less for his estate on
account of the injury, and has therefore no claim to recover
damages for it." Per Justice Lewis in 22 Pa. 32.
In answer to this the Pennsylvania Supreme Court states that
the learned Justice was speaking there of damages arising from
the exercise of eminent domain by railroad companies. "In all
such cases the injury is palpable. There is no reason why the
grantee of the land, in the interval between the appropriation
and the completion of the work, should be compensated in dam-
ages, when he has probably gained a reduction in price, because
of the damage, equal to the amount of damage."
But in the case at bar the owner in possession alone is entitled
to damages because he bought in ignorance of the insufficient
support. "Until they actually occur, no one can tell when they
will occur, or that they ever will."
It is submitted that if the last statement is true as respects
the right of the present owner to recover for the "cave in," it is
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equally true likewise as to the point of time at which the Statute
of Limitations begins to run. If the injury is not so apparent
as to deter a prospective purchaser from paying full -price for the
surface land, why is not the injury so obscure that -the Statute
of Limitations is barred from running? Contra non valentam
agere nulla currit prescriptio.
It will not be seriously questioned in any jurisdiction that the'
measure of damages, in a recovery for the breach of the right to
support, must embrace all the injurious consequences of the
original act, unknown as well as known, which shall arise there-
after as well as those which have arisen. A right of action is
satisfied by one recovery. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. What then will the Supreme Court do, after a
recovery is had by the original owner for present and-prospective
damage arising from a breach of the right (but unaccompanied
by a subsidence) when a suit is brought by the owner in posses-
- sion for actual damage arising from a subsidence? "The owner
in possession, when the consequences follow, is the one who
suffers." P. 485.
In Bonomi v. BacAhouse, Willis, J., says: "If the defendant is
right these consequences follow: whenever a mine or quarry is
worked, the worker may be subjected to actions by all the sur-
rounding owners; nay, they would in self-defence be compelled
to bring them, if there was any reasonable ground to suppose that
the working would in time produce damage to their property.
It would be in vain that the worker would say: "You will not be
injured; the workings are not injurious; if they turn out likely
to be so, I will take means to prevent it; at all events, wait till
you are injured." Vexatious and oppressive actions might be
brought, on the one hand, and, on the other, an unjust immunity
obtained for secret workings of the most mischievous character,,
but the result of which-did not appear within six years."
"We should be unwilling," said the Court of Exchequer, as
quoted above, "to rest our judgment upon mere grounds of
policy; but we cannot but observe that a rule of law, or rather the -
construction of a Statute of Limitations, which would deprive
a man of redress after the expiration of six years, when the act
causing the damage was unknown to him, and when in many
instances he would be in inevitable ignorance of it, would be
harsh and contrary to the ordinary principles of law." -
An action unquestionabl will lie for the infringement of an
absolute right; but the right here was to have land supported,
and as long as it was supported the right was not infringed. The
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is wholly
inconsistent with the right of the defendant to use his property
as he pleases, provided he does not injure that of his neighbor.
In the light of this conclusion the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alie-
num non l7adas, should be read without the non.
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